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On Privacy of Quantized Sensor Measurements through Additive Noise
Carlos Murguia, Iman Shames, Farhad Farokhi, and Dragan Nešic´
Abstract—We study the problem of maximizing privacy of
quantized sensor measurements by adding random variables. In
particular, we consider the setting where information about the
state of a process is obtained using noisy sensor measurements.
This information is quantized and sent to a remote station
through an unsecured communication network. It is desired
to keep the state of the process private; however, because the
network is not secure, adversaries might have access to sensor
information, which could be used to estimate the process state.
To avoid an accurate state estimation, we add random numbers
to the quantized sensor measurements and send the sum to
the remote station instead. The distribution of these random
variables is designed to minimize the mutual information
between the sum and the quantized sensor measurements for
a desired level of distortion – how different the sum and the
quantized sensor measurements are allowed to be. Simulations
are presented to illustrate our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past half-century, scientific and technological
advances have greatly improved the performance of engi-
neering systems. However, these new technologies have also
led to vulnerabilities within critical infrastructure – e.g.,
power, water, transportation. Advances in communication
and computing power have given rise to adversaries with en-
hanced and adaptive capabilities. Depending on adversary’s
resources and system defenses, opponents may infer critical
information about the operation of systems or even dete-
riorate their functionality. Therefore, designing efficient de-
fence mechanisms is of importance for guaranteeing privacy,
safety, and proper operation of critical systems. All these new
challenges have attracted the attention of researchers from
different fields (e.g., computer science, information theory,
control theory) in the broad area of privacy and security of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [1]-[16].
In most engineering applications, information about the
state of systems is obtained through sensor measurements.
Once this information is collected, it is usually quantized,
encoded, and sent to a remote station for signal processing
and decision-making purposes through communication net-
works. Examples of such systems are numerous: water and
electricity consumption meters, traffic monitoring systems,
industrial control systems, and so on. If the communication
network is public or unsecured, adversaries might access and
estimate the state of the system. To avoid an accurate state
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estimation, we add random noise to the quantized sensor
measurements before transmission and send the sum to the
remote station instead. This noise is designed to increase
privacy of the transmitted data. Note, however, that it is
not desired to overly distort the original sensor data by
injecting noise. We might change the data excessively for
practical purposes. Hence, when designing the additive noise,
we need to take into account the trade-off between privacy
and distortion.
In this manuscript, we follow an information-theoretic
approach. We propose to use mutual information between
quantized-sensor-data and quantized-sensor-data plus privacy
noise as privacy metric, and the mean square error between
them as distortion metric. The design of the discrete additive
noise is posed as a convex optimization problem. In particu-
lar, the distribution of the noise is designed to minimize the
mutual information for a desired level of maximal distortion.
The use of additive noise to increase privacy is com-
mon practice. In the context of privacy of databases, a
popular approach is differential privacy [12]-[17], where
noise is added to the response of queries so that private
information stored in the database cannot be inferred. In
differential privacy, because it provides certain privacy guar-
antees, Laplace noise is usually used [18]. However, when
maximal privacy with minimal distortion is desired, Laplace
noise is generally not the optimal solution. This raises the
fundamental question: for a given allowable distortion level,
what is the noise distribution achieving maximal privacy?
This question has many possible answers depending on
the particular privacy and distortion metrics being con-
sidered and the system configuration [19]-[22]. There are
also results addressing this question from an information
theoretic perspective, where information metrics – e.g.,
mutual information, entropy, Kullback-Leibler divergence,
and Fisher information – are used to quantify privacy [1]-
[4],[23]-[25].
In general, if the data to be kept private follows con-
tinuous distributions, the problem of finding the optimal
additive noise to maximize privacy (even without considering
distortion) is hard to solve. If a close-form solution for
the distribution is desired, the problem amounts to solving
a set of nonlinear partial differential equations which, in
general, might not have a solution, and even if they do
have a solution, it is hard to find [1]. This problem has
been addressed by imposing some particular structure on
the considered distributions or assuming the data to be kept
private is deterministic [1],[20],[21].
The authors in [20],[21] consider deterministic input data
sets and treat optimal distributions as distributions that con-
centrate probability around zero as much as possible while
ensuring differential privacy. Under this framework, they
obtain a family of piecewise constant density functions that
achieve minimal distortion for a given level of privacy. In [1],
the authors consider the problem of preserving the privacy
of deterministic databases using constrained additive noise.
They use the Fisher information and the Cramer-Rao bound
to construct a privacy metric between noise-free data and the
one with the additive noise and find the probability density
function that minimizes it. Moreover, they prove that, in the
unconstrained case, the optimal noise distribution minimizing
the Fisher information is Gaussian.
Most of the aforementioned papers propose optimal con-
tinuous distributions assuming deterministic data. However,
in a networked context, unavoidable sensor noise leads
to stochastic data and thus existing tools do not fit this
setting. Here, we identify two possibilities for addressing
our problem: 1) we might inject continuous noise to sensor
measurements, then quantize the sum, and send it over the
unsecured network; or 2), the one considered here, quantize
sensor measurements, add noise with discrete distribution,
and send the sum over the network. As motivated above, to
address the first option, even assuming deterministic sensor
data, we have to impose some particular structure on the
distributions of the additive noise; and, if sensor data is
stochastic, the problem becomes hard to solve (sometimes
even untractable). As we prove in this manuscript, if we
select the second alternative, under some mild assumptions
on the alphabet of the injected noise, we can cast the
problem of finding the optimal noise as a constrained convex
optimization. To the best of the authors knowledge, this
problem has not been considered before as it is posed it
here.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Entropy, Joint Entropy, and Conditional Entropy
Consider a discrete random variable X with alphabet X
and probability mass function p(x) = Pr[X = x], x ∈ X ,
where Pr[a] denotes probability of event a. We denote the
probability mass function by p(x) rather than pX(x) to
simplify notation. Thus, p(x) and p(y) refer to two different
random variables, and are in fact different probability mass
functions, pX(x) and pY (y), respectively.
Definition 1 The entropy of a discrete random variable X
with alphabet X and probability mass function p(x) is
defined as H [X ] := −
∑
x∈X p(x) log p(x).
The log is base 2 and thus the entropy is expressed in bits.
We use the convention that 0 log 0 = 0 [26].
Definition 2 The joint entropy of a pair of discrete random
variables (X,Y ) with alphabets X and Y , respectively,
and joint probability mass function p(x, y) is defined as
H [X,Y ] := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) log p(x, y).
Definition 3 Let (X,Y ) ∼ p(x, y), then the conditional
entropy of Y given X , H [Y |X ], is defined as
H [Y |X ] := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log p(y|x).
Lemma 1 [26] (Chain Rules for Entropy)
• H [X,Y ] = H [X ] +H [Y |X ].
• H [X,Y |Z] = H [X |Z] +H [Y |X,Z].
• H [Y1, . . . , Yn] =
∑n
i=1H [Yi|Yi−1, . . . , Y1].
• Let Z = Z1, . . . , Zm, then:
H [Y1, . . . , Yn|Z] =
∑n
i=1H [Yi|Yi−1, . . . , Y1, Z].
B. Mutual Information
Definition 4 Consider two random variables, X and Y ,
with joint probability mass function p(x, y) and marginal
probability mass functions, p(x) and p(y), respectively.
Their mutual information I[X ;Y ] is defined as the relative
entropy between the joint distribution and the product dis-
tribution p(x)p(y), i.e.,
I[X ;Y ] := −
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈Y
p(x, y) log
p(x, y)
p(x)p(y)
.
Lemma 2 [26] (Mutual Information and Entropy)
• I[X ;Y ] = H [X ]−H [X |Y ] = H [Y ]−H [Y |X ].
• I[X ;Y |Z] = H [X |Z]−H [X |Y, Z].
• Let Z = Z1, . . . , Zm, then:
I[Y1, . . . , Yn;Z] = H [Y1, . . . , Yn]−H [Y1, . . . , Yn|Z].
The mutual information between two jointly distributed
random variables, X and Y , is a measure of the dependence
between X and Y . The following properties of mutual
information can be found in [26] and references therein.
Also, sketches of the proofs can be found in [27].
(P1) I[X ;Y ] = 0 if and only if X and Y are independent.
(P2) Let Y and Z be independent discrete random variables
and V = Y + Z; then, I[V ;Y ] = H [V ] − H [Z], i.e.,
H [Y + Z|Y ] = H [Z].
(P3) The mutual information does not increase for functions
of the random variables (data processing inequality):
I[f(X);Y ] ≤ I[X ;Y ].
Lemma 3 [26] (Chain Rule for Mutual Information)
• Let Y = Y1, . . . , Yn, and Z = Z1, . . . , Zm, then:
I[Y ;Z] =
∑n
i=1 I[Yi;Yi−1, . . . , Y1, Z].
Lemma 4 Let Y = Y1, . . . , Ym and Z = Z1, . . . , Zm be
2m independent discrete random variables and V = Y +Z ,
i.e, Vi = Yi + Zi, i = 1, . . . ,m; then:
I[V ;Y ] =
m∑
i=1
I[Vi;Yi] =
m∑
i=1
H [Vi]−H [Zi].
Proof : By Lemma 2, I[V ;Y ] = H [V ] − H [V |Y ], and, by
Lemma 1, H [V ] − H [V |Y ] =
∑n
i=1H [Vi|Vi−1, . . . , V1] −
H [Vi|Vi−1, . . . , V1, Y ]. By assumption, the elements of
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Fig. 1. System Configuration.
{Z, Y } are all independent; then, the elements of V are also
independent. It follows that
H [V ]−H [V |Y ] =
n∑
i=1
H [Vi]−H [Vi|Y ]
=
n∑
i=1
H [Vi]−H [Yi + Zi|Y ]
=
n∑
i=1
H [Vi]−H [Zi]
=
n∑
i=1
I[Vi;Yi],
where the last equality follows from (P2) given above. 
III. PROBLEM SETUP
LetX ∈ Rn be the state of some deterministic process that
must be kept private. Information about the state is obtained
through m sensors of the form:
Y = CX +W, (1)
with sensor measurements Y ∈ Rm, matrix C ∈ Rm×n,
and sensor noise W ∈ Rm, E[W ] = 0, ΣW := E[WWT ],
ΣW > 0. The entries of the noise are uncorrelated, i.e.,
ΣW = diag[σ
2
1 , . . . , σ
2
m]. Then, E[Y ] = CX , the covariance
ΣY := E[(Y −CX)(Y−CX)T ] = ΣW , and the entries of Y
are uncorrelated. We assume that the probability distribution
of Y is known. This is not an strong assumption since it
is often possible to obtain a number of realization of Y
to estimate its distribution. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Ym)
T . Each
sensor measurement Yi, i = 1, . . . ,m is quantized using a
uniform quantizer on a finite range Qi(Yi, y
1
i ,∆i, Ni):
Qi(Yi, y
1
i ,∆i, Ni) :=


y1i if Yi ∈ (−∞, y
1
i +
∆i
2
],
y2i if Yi ∈ (y
1
i +
∆i
2
, y2i +
∆i
2
],
y3i if Yi ∈ (y
2
i +
∆i
2
, y3i +
∆i
2
],
...
y
Ni
i if Yi ∈ (y
Ni−1
i +
∆i
2
,∞),
(2)
where yji = y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i, j = 1, . . . , Ni. Thus, for each
sensor, the Ni quantization levels are given by
YQi := {y
1
i , y
1
i +∆i, . . . , y
1
i + (Ni − 1)∆i}.
It follows that the vector of quantized sensor measurements
Y Q := (Y Q1 , . . . , Y
Q
m )
T , Y Qi := Qi(Yi, y
1
i ,∆i, Ni) is
determined by the initial quantization level y1i ∈ R, the
quantization step ∆i ∈ R>0, and the number of intervals
Ni ∈ N, i = 1, . . . ,m. Note that, because we know the
distribution of Y and the quantizer, we can always obtain
the probability mass function p(yQ) of Y Q (and thus also
p(yQi ) of Y
Q
i ). Moreover, the alphabet of the discrete random
variable Y Qi is the set of quantization levels Y
Q
i .
After Y is quantized, a random vector Z is added to Y Q
to obtain V := Z+Y Q. The vector V is transmitted over an
unsecured communication network to a remote station, see
Fig. 1. Notice that, if we do not add Z to Y Q before trans-
mission, information about the state is directly accessible
through the unsecured network. To minimize this information
leakage, we send the sum V = Z+Y Q to the remote station
instead of directly sending Y Q. Note, however, that we do
not want to make Y Q and Y Q+Z overly different either. By
adding Z , we might distort Y Q excessively for any practical
purposes. Hence, when designing the distribution of Z , we
need to consider the trade-off between privacy and distortion.
In this manuscript, we propose to use the mutual information
between V = Z+Y Q and Y Q, I[V ;Y Q], as privacy metric,
and the mean square error, E[(V − Y Q)2], as distortion
metric. Thus, we aim at minimizing I[V ;Y Q] using the
probability mass function of Z , p(z), as optimization variable
subject to E[(V − Y Q)2] = E[Z2] ≤ ǫ, for a desired level
of distortion ǫ ∈ R>0. In what follows, we formally present
the optimization problem we seek to address.
Problem 1 For given Y Q with corresponding p(yQ) and
desired distortion level ǫ ∈ R≥0, find the probability mass
function p(z) of Z solution of the optimization problem:

min
p(z)
I[Y Q + Z;Y Q],
s.t. E[Z2] ≤ ǫ.
(3)
Remark 1 Note that if we had access to Z at the other
end of the network, and saturation to Y Q + Z does not
occur, we could recover Y Q exactly from Z , and thus cast the
optimization problem in (3) without the distortion constraint.
Remark 2 In Problem 1, we could consider individual con-
straints for the distortion, i.e., E[Z2i ] ≤ ǫi, ǫi ∈ R≥0,
i = 1, . . . ,m, instead of the joint constraint E[Z2] ≤ ǫ.
Indeed, if E[Z2i ] ≤ ǫi, then E[Z
2] ≤
∑m
i=1 ǫi.
IV. RESULTS
To delimit the solution of Problem 1, we restrict the class
of probability mass functions of Z . First, we fix the alphabet
Zi of Zi – the i-th component of Z – to be equal to the
TABLE I
PROBABILITY MASS FUNCTION p(vi) OF Vi .
Vi v
1
i := 2y
1
i v
2
i := 2y
1
i +∆i · · · v
Ni
i := 2y
1
i + (Ni − 1)∆i v
Ni+1
i := 2y
1
i +Ni∆i · · · v
2Ni−1
i := 2y
1
i + 2(Ni − 1)∆i
p(vi) p
V
i,1 := p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,1
pVi,2 := p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,2+
pYi,2p
Z
i,1
· · ·
pV
i,Ni
:= pY
i,Ni
pZi,1+
pY
i,Ni−1
pZi,2+
pYi,Ni−2
pZi,3 + · · ·+
pYi,1p
Z
i,Ni
pV
i,Ni+1
:= pY
i,Ni
pZi,2+
pYi,Ni−1
pZi,3 + · · ·+
pYi,2p
Z
i,Ni
· · · pVi,2Ni−1
:= pYi,Nip
Z
i,Ni
alphabet YQi of Y
Q
i , i.e., equal to the quantization levels.
This imposes a tractable convex structure on the objective
and restrictions, and reduces the optimization variables to
the probabilities of each element of the alphabet. The case
with arbitrary alphabet leads to a combinatorial optimization
problem where the objective of (3) changes its structure for
different combinations. In this manuscript, we do not address
this case; it is left as a future work.
Next, note that, because X is deterministic and the covari-
ance matrix ΣW is diagonal, the elements of the vector Y
Q
are mutually independent. Then, if we let Z to have inde-
pendent components, the objective function I[Y Q +Z;Y Q]
in (3) can be written as follows.
Proposition 1 Let the components of Z be mutually inde-
pendent; then, I[Y Q+Z;Y Q] =
∑m
i=1 I[Y
Q
i +Zi;Y
Q
i ] and
I[Y Qi + Zi;Y
Q
i ] = H [Vi]−H [Zi], i = 1, . . . ,m.
Proof : Proposition 1 follows from Lemma 4.
To impose a decoupled structure in the optimization prob-
lem, as pointed out in Remark 2, we consider individual
constraints for the distortion, i.e., E[Z2i ] ≤ ǫi, ǫi ∈ R≥0,
i = 1, . . . ,m. Then, we can replace (3) by the following m
decoupled optimization problems:{
min
p(zi)
H [Vi]−H [Zi],
s.t. E[Z2i ] ≤ ǫi, i = 1, . . . ,m,
(4)
where p(zi) denotes the probability mass function of Zi and
ǫi is the desired distortion level associated with the mean
square error E[(Vi − Y
Q
i )
2].
In what follows, we focus on the solution of (4) assuming
independence of Z and restricting the alphabet Zi of Zi to
be equal to YQi .
Assumption 1 The entries of Z are mutually independent
and the alphabet Zi of Zi is equal to the quantization levels
YQi , i.e., it equals the alphabet of Y
Q
i .
Next, we write I[Y Qi + Zi;Y
Q
i ] = H [Vi] −H [Zi] in (4) in
terms of p(yQi ) and p(zi). Denote the probabilities of Y
Q
i
and Zi as follows:
pYi,j := Pr[Y
Q
i = y
j
i ], (5)
pZi,j := Pr[Zi = y
j
i ], (6)
with j = 1, . . . , Ni. Then, the entropy H [Zi] is given by
H [Zi] = −
∑Ni
j=1 p
Z
i,j log p
Z
i,j and E[Z
2
i ] =
∑Ni
j=1(y
j
i )
2pZi,j .
Moreover, since yji = y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i, then, in terms of the
quantizer parameters, E[Z2i ] =
∑Ni
j=1(y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i)
2pZi,j .
To get an expression for H [Vi], we need the probability
mass function p(vi) of Vi. We compute all the possible
elements of the alphabet of Vi = Y
Q
i + Zi and their
corresponding probabilities in terms of the elements of the
alphabet YQi , y
j
i = y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i. Thus, the random
variable Vi has an alphabet with 2Ni − 1 elements and the
corresponding probabilities are the sums of the probabilities
of equal elements. The probability mass function p(vi) of Vi
is given in Table I.
Now, we can write an explicit expression for the objective
function in (4):
I[Y Qi + Zi;Y
Q
i ] = H [Vi]−H [Zi], (7)
= −
2Ni−1∑
j=1
pVi,j log p
V
i,j +
Ni∑
j=1
pZi,j log p
Z
i,j ,
where
vji := 2y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i, j = 1, . . . , 2Ni − 1, (8)
pVi,j := Pr[Vi = v
j
i ] (9)
=


j∑
k=1
pYi,j+1−kp
Z
i,k, j = 1, . . . , Ni,
Ni∑
k=j+1−Ni
pYi,j+1−kp
Z
i,k, j = Ni + 1, . . . , 2Ni − 1.
The expressions in (7)-(9) give a complete characterization
of the objective I[Y Qi + Zi;Y
Q
i ] in terms of the known
probabilities of the quantized sensors pYi,j , j = 1, . . . , Ni, and
the optimization variables, the probabilities of the injected
noise pZi,j , j = 1, . . . , Ni. Moreover, the distortion constraint
E[Z2i ] =
∑Ni
j=1(y
1
i + (j − 1)∆i)
2pZi,j ≤ ǫi is linear in
pZi,j . Therefore, if the objective is convex, we could, in
principle, efficiently solve (4) numerically. However, since
I[Y Qi +Zi;Y
Q
i ] = H [Vi]−H [Zi], H [Vi] is concave in p
V
i,j ,
and H [Zi] is concave in p
Z
i,j [26], it is not clear whether
H [Vi]−H [Zi] is convex in p
Z
i,j or not.
Proposition 2 For given pYi,j , the function I[Y
Q
i + Zi;Y
Q
i ]
is convex in the probabilities pZi,j , j = 1, . . . , Ni.
Proof : Define the sum:
fVi : = −
2Ni−2∑
j=2
pVi,j log p
V
i,j .
The entropy of Vi can be written in terms of f
V
i as
H [Vi] = f
V
i − p
V
i,1 log p
V
i,1 − p
V
i,2Ni−1 log p
V
i,2Ni−1, (10)
= fVi − p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,1 log p
Y
i,1 − p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,1 log p
Z
i,1
− pYi,Nip
Z
i,Ni
log pYi,Ni − p
Y
i,Ni
pZi,Ni log p
Z
i,Ni
,
where the last equality follows from (9). Write the entropies
H [Zi] and H [Y
Q
i ] as
H [Zi] = −
(
pYi,1 + . . .+ p
Y
i,Ni
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
Ni∑
j=1
pZi,j log p
Z
i,j, (11)
=: fZi − p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,1 log p
Z
i,1 − p
Y
i,Ni
pZi,Ni log p
Z
i,Ni
,
H [Y Qi ] = −
(
pZi,1 + . . .+ p
Z
i,Ni
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
Ni∑
j=1
pYi,j log p
Y
i,j, (12)
=: fYi − p
Y
i,1p
Z
i,1 log p
Y
i,1 − p
Y
i,Ni
pZi,Ni log p
Y
i,Ni
.
Combining (10)-(12), we can write
H [Zi] +H [Y
Q
i ] = f
Z
i + f
Y
i +H [Vi]− f
V
i ,
which implies H [Vi] = H [Zi]+H [Y
Q
i ]+f
V
i −f
Z
i −f
Y
i and
thus I[Y Qi +Zi;Y
Q
i ] = H [Y
Q
i ]+f
V
i −f
Z
i −f
Y
i . The entropy
H [Y Qi ] is constant; then, I[Y
Q
i + Zi;Y
Q
i ] is convex if and
only if fi(p
Z
i,1, . . . , p
Z
i,Ni
) := fVi −f
Z
i −f
Y
i is convex. Next,
collecting the pZi,j terms and using properties of logarithmic
functions, we can write fi(p
Z
i,1, . . . , p
Z
i,Ni
) as follows
fi =


j∑
k=1
pYi,kp
Z
i,j+1−k log
(
pYi,kp
Z
i,j+1−k∑j
l=1 p
Y
i,lp
Z
i,j+1−l
)
,
for j = 2, . . . , Ni,
Ni∑
k=j−1−Ni
pYi,kp
Z
i,j+1−k log
(
pYi,kp
Z
i,j+1−k∑j
l=1 p
Y
i,lp
Z
i,j+1−l
)
,
for j = Ni + 1, . . . , 2Ni − 2.
Note that every element of fi(p
Z
i,1, . . . , p
Z
i,Ni
) above is a
function of the form g(a, b, c, . . . , r) = a log
(
a
a+b+c+···+r
)
,
a, b, c . . . , r ∈ [0, 1]. The function g(a, b, c, . . . , r) can be
proved to be convex using Theorem 2.7.1 in [26] – the
log sum inequality. Hence, fi(p
Z
i,1, . . . , p
Z
i,Ni
) is the sum of
convex functions and thus convex as well. 
Note that the ultimate goal is to make it hard for adver-
saries to infer X from V = Y Q + Z . That is, if someone
estimates X using the available data at the public network
V , the estimation Xˆ(V ) should carry less information about
X than an estimate Xˆ(Y Q) obtained using Y Q directly. In
other words, we want to make I[Xˆ(V ); Xˆ(Y Q)] small.
Proposition 3 For some functions hV , hY : R
m → Rm, let
Xˆ(V ) := hV (V ) and Xˆ(Y
Q) := hY (Y
Q) be estimates of
X using V = Y Q + Z and Y Q, respectively. Then, it is
satisfied that I[Xˆ(Y Q +Z); Xˆ(Y Q)] ≤ I[Y Q +Z;Y Q] for
any pair of functions hY (·) and hV (·).
Proof : The assertion follows from property (P3) in Section
II – the data processing inequality [26].
Remark 3 Proposition 3 has a nice interpretation: for any
pair of estimators (Xˆ(Y Q + Z), Xˆ(Y Q)) that can be con-
structed using Y Q + Z and Y Q, respectively; the mutual
information between them is always upper bounded by
I[Y Q+Z;Y Q] independently of the estimators. This implies
that by minimizing I[Y Q + Z;Y Q], we are decreasing the
information I[Xˆ(Y Q+Z); Xˆ(Y Q)]. Indeed, the tightness of
this bound depends on the particular choice of estimators.
A. Multiple Observations
In real-time applications, we often have consecutive ob-
servations of the variable X in (1), i.e., a system of the form:
Y (t) = CX +W (t), t ∈ N, (13)
with different realizations of sensor data Y (t) ∈ Rm and
sensor noise W (t) ∈ Rm at each time step t. If the noise
W (t) is an i.i.d. process (which is the case most of the
time) with ΣW := E[W (t)W (t)
T ] = diag[σ21 , . . . , σ
2
m] and
E[W (t)] = 0 for all t, the time-dependent model (13)
can be written as a static one for a finite number of time-
steps M . That is, we can collect sensor data for a time
window of M steps, stack each set of sensor measurements
as Y˜M := (Y (1)
T , . . . , Y (M)T )T ∈ RMm, and use this
stacked vector to produce a stacked system:
Y˜M = C˜MX + W˜M , (14)
with sensor noise W˜M := (W (1)
T , . . . ,W (M)T )T ∈ RMm
and stacked matrix C˜M := (C
T , . . . , CT )T ∈ RMm×n.
Because W (t) is an i.i.d. process and ΣW is diagonal, all
entries of W˜M and Y˜M are mutually independent. Hence, we
can use the tools described above to design the distribution
of a noise vector Z˜M ∈ RMm that minimizes the mutual
information I[Y˜ QM + Z˜M ; Y˜
Q
M ], where Y˜
Q
M denotes the quan-
tized Y˜M . Actually, if we let Z˜M := (Z(1)
T , . . . , Z(M)T )T
and Z(t) be an i.i.d. process with independent entries, it can
be proved that I[Y˜ QM + Z˜M ; Y˜
Q
M ] = MI[Y
Q+Z;Y ], where,
with abuse of notation, Y Q and Z denote two random vectors
thrown from the distributions of the i.i.d. processes Y Q(t)
and Z(t). That is, the mutual information I[Y˜ QM + Z˜M ; Y˜
Q
M ]
is simply M times I[Y Q + Z;Y ]. It follows that, the dis-
tribution of Z(t) = (Z1(t)
T , . . . , Zm(t)
T )T that minimizes
I[Y˜ QM+Z˜M ; Y˜
Q
M ], for arbitrary largeM , is the solution, p(zi),
i = 1, . . . ,m, of problem (4), i.e., Zi(t) ∼ p(zi), t ∈ N is
the optimal solution.
V. SIMULATIONS RESULTS
Consider system (1) with X = (π2, π2/4)T , C = I2, and
sensor noise W = (W1,W2)
T , W1 ∼ N (0, σ21), σ
2
1 = π,
W2 ∼ U(−a, a), a = π2/40, σ22 = (1/3)a
2. Each sensor
measurement Yi, i = 1, 2, is quantized using the uniform
quantizer (2) with y11 = π
2 − 3σ1, ∆1 = 6σ1/N1, N1 = 11,
and y12 = 9.09a, ∆2 = 2a/N2, N2 = 11. In Figure 2,
we show the optimal distribution p(z1) of Z1 solution of
(4), first without the distortion constraint, and then for the
distortion levels ǫ1 = 60, 40. The distortion level for the
unconstrained case is E[Z21 ] = 105.03. For comparison, we
also show the distributions p(yQ1 ) of Y
Q
1 and the one of
the sum V1 = Y
Q
1 + Z1, p(v1). In Figure 3, we show the
corresponding results for sensor 2: the optimal distributions
No distortion constraint
Fig. 2.
for the unconstrained case, which yields E[Z22 ] = 6.10, and
then for the distortion levels ǫ2 = 5.6, 5.1.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have provided results on privacy of quantized noisy
sensor measurements by adding optimal random variables.
To minimize the information leakage due to unsecured
communication networks, we have proposed to add random
variables to the quantized sensor measurements before trans-
mission. The distributions of these discrete random variables
have been designed to minimize the mutual information
between the sum and the quantized sensor measurements for
a desired level of distortion. In particular, we have posed
the design problem as a convex optimization where the opti-
mization variables are the probabilities of the injected noise.
We have provided simulation results to test the performance
of our tools.
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